

Strictly confidential

Paraphrase

DECEMBER 4, 1941.

The following message was received from the Governor of Guam November 24, 1941:

"At 1217 local time today unidentified two-engined plane sighted, circling southern end of island. Altitude approximately 15,000 feet. At 1229 local time plane passed out of sight to southwest."

Telegram sent

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
December 6, 1941.

AMEMBASSY

Tokyo (Japan).

Your 1908, November 26, 9 p. m.

The Foreign Office note has been brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities of this Government.

In connection with this question, you may be interested to know that the Navy Department has been informed by the Governor of Guam that about noon on November 24 an unidentified two-motored airplane circled the southern extremity of Guam for about ten minutes flying at an altitude of approximately 15,000 feet.

/s/ HULL
/s/ E W

FE:RLS:NHS FE

EXHIBIT NO. 131

(This exhibit was originally designed to incorporate the prior testimony of Rear Admiral H. H. Kimmel before (1) the Roberts Commission, (2) the Navy Court of Inquiry and (3) the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Inasmuch as the entire transcript of testimony taken incident to each of these proceedings has been set forth as exhibits to the Joint Committee record, the prior testimony of Admiral Kimmel is not being printed at this point pursuant to direction of the Committee. For reference thereto, see Index.)

EXHIBIT NO. 132

REPORT ON CONFERENCE BETWEEN FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER TOGO AND THE
AMERICAN AMBASSADOR 7:30 A. M. DEC 8, 1941

1. I stated, "After my conference with you last night I succeeded in obtaining an answer from the Emperor to the personal telegram from President Roosevelt to the Emperor which you presented at that conference. Thus, His Imperial Majesty orders me to convey the following message to President Roosevelt through you:

"We have heretofore commanded the Japanese Government to reply to the query of the President of the United States respecting the assembling of Japanese troops in French Indo China. Further, the withdrawal from French Indo China was one of the matters discussed in the Japanese-American negotiations and we have already had the Japanese Government state its opinions on the matter. Therefore, please consult these statements to understand our position. We believe the President must be fully aware of the fact that the object of our wishes is the establishment of peace in the Pacific and throughout the world, and that, in accordance with our desires, the Japanese Government has up to the present time striven to attain that goal."

The Ambassador listened to the Emperor's note with respectful attention and replied that he would transmit it to the President immediately. He then said that he had been instructed to request an audience of the Emperor to present

the President's telegram personally, and since the relations between our two nations were now facing a grave crisis he requested that I take special pains to arrange for an audience. I answered that if his sole object in requesting an audience was to present the President's telegram, I doubted, considering the nature of the Emperor's note, that an audience was necessary. I pointed out, however, that I had no intention of standing in his way and if he had any further statement to make, in addition to the telegram, I would of course do everything I could to arrange for one. The Ambassador seemed very pleased and expressed his gratitude. (At his request, I have submitted a provisional translation of the English text of his application [for an audience] (as Supplement A)).

2. Next I handed the Ambassador a copy of the note to the United States and said that, as he knew, the Imperial Government had done everything in its power to bring the Japanese-American negotiations to a successful conclusion and that I myself had worked earnestly to that end.

"However,"

I continued,

"we have come to the conclusion that the attitude of the American Government unfortunately precludes any prospect of reaching an agreement even though the negotiations should be further continued, and we have therefore ordered this note to be presented to the Government of the United States on the afternoon of December 7, Washington time. I am very sorry that things have worked out this way."

[2] The Ambassador said that he would return to the Embassy to read the document and would refrain from making any statement at this time, whereupon he withdrew.

3. The conference lasted about half an hour, but at that time Ambassador Grew stated that President Roosevelt had sent a personal telegram to the Emperor and that he had been instructed to present it to the Emperor himself, and therefore he requested the Foreign Minister's help in arranging for an audience. The Foreign Minister answered that it was now late at night and steps for arranging an audience could not be taken before the next morning. He suggested that the Ambassador's chances for getting an audience would probably depend on the contents of the President's telegram. Ambassador Grew informally handed the Foreign Minister a copy of the telegram which he had with him (Supplement A), again requested that the Foreign Minister do everything possible to arrange for an audience in view of the gravity of the situation, and withdrew after arranging for another interview.

4. The Foreign Minister proceeded to the Premier's official residence with a summary translation of the President's telegram, and there, at an emergency conference with the Premier and the rest of the cabinet, determined in general the line of action to be taken on this matter. [Two lines illegible.]

5. At about 3 A. M. the Foreign Minister returned to his residence. He waited as directed, until 6 o'clock on the morning of the 8th to notify the English and American Ambassadors of the rupture of Anglo-American negotiations. At this time he handed the following statement to Ambassador Grew as the Emperor's answer to President Roosevelt's wire:

[Here follows the text of the Emperor's note as given above.]

GIST OF CONFERENCE BETWEEN FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER TOGO AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR 8:00 A. M. DEC. 8, 1941

Following my interview with the American Ambassador, I called the British Ambassador to an interview. I told him directly as I had the American Ambassador that it had become unavoidably necessary to break off Japanese-American negotiations, and handed him a copy of the note addressed to the United States. At the same time I said "Although this is only the copy of a note to the United States, please understand that the Imperial Government, realizing Great Britain's great interest in these negotiations and that the interests of Great Britain and the United States are inseparably connected, has included in the note its opinions on all problems currently pending between Japan and Great Britain." The Ambassador thereupon remarked that he regretted the rupture of negotiations as deeply as I did. He went on to say that there were reports to the effect that Japanese vessels with a large number of troops aboard were proceeding westward

* From this point on this would seem to be a totally different document, referring to what preceded the conference of the morning of the 8th.

through the Gulf of Siam and that it would seem that possibly part of them were headed for Thailand and part for the Malay Peninsula. The invasion of these areas by the Japanese Army would produce a most serious situation. As he had stated a little while ago (here he referred to the interview with me on the 6th), Great Britain had no intention of violating Thai independence and territorial integrity provided that other nations respected them. Therefore he hoped that the Japanese Government would restrain its Military.

I answered that I was by no means certain of the situation since last evening. However, just this morning I had heard a report to the effect that the English had assembled Indian troops on the Thai border. I thought it probable that our vessels were cruising the waters adjacent to that area to be ready for anything that might come up in a situation which was plainly not normal. I had just ordered our ambassador to Thailand to report on the situation, and as soon as that report arrived, would consider this matter in a general study of the situation. Whereupon the British Ambassador advised me to be wary of reports fabricated by elements seeking to disturb the peace, and withdrew.

ON THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN
MEETING OF PRIVY COUNCIL DEC. 8, 1941

Written by Matsumoto—Head of Treaty Bureau

In the 11th item of Article 6 of the Internal Orders decided upon at the time of the Reorganization of the Privy Council in December 1938, was included a section on "The Declaration of War." It was unclear whether this gave the Privy Council the right to advise the decision to engage in war, or just the authority for advising the formal declaration of war. However, when war was declared against the United States and Great Britain, the decision to engage in war had already been made at the previous conference of Dec. 1, 1941, so the Privy Council was only to consider an address to the throne stating "We declare war against the United States and Great Britain." A draft of an Imperial Rescript declaring war was attached to the Address to the Throne for advisement. (The Address to the Throne and the draft of the Imperial Rescript were drawn up by the Cabinet.)

Meeting of Committee of Advisement

Dec. 8—7:40 A. M.

In the Imperial Palace

Tozo Room

Those Present

All members of the Advisory Council [Komonkan]

All Cabinet ministers (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Togo, was absent, because he was holding interviews with the United States and British Ambassadors).

Head of the Legal Bureau—Moriyama

Foreign Affairs Officials:

Yamamoto, Head of the American Bureau

Sakamoto, Head of the Europe-Asia Bureau

Matsumoto, Head of the Treaty Bureau

Army Officials:

Muto, Head of Military Affairs Bureau

Navy Officials:

Muto, Head of Military Affairs Bureau

First, the Navy Minister reported on the military action against American and British Troops which had been in progress since this morning in the Malayan, Hongkong, and Hawaiian areas.

1st President of the Council—I propose that a Committee of Advisement headed by the Vice-President of the Council, and constituted of all the members of the Advisory Council, meet immediately and consider this matter.

Premier Tojo—explained the reasons for declaring war.

Advisor Ishii—At what time will war be declared? It is necessary to make sure that America and Britain don't saddle us with the responsibility.

Premier—We hope for an immediate declaration.

[2] Advisor Kubota—A state of war already exists, but what is the viewpoint of the Imperial Headquarters.

Premier—At the conference of Dec. 1 they determined to commence hostilities against England, America, and the Netherlands.

Advisor Shimizu—What is the attitude of Thailand?

Premier—It is not yet clear, but negotiations are in progress for a policy of Mutual Defense.

Advisor Shimizu—Aren't we going to declare war on Holland?

Premier—We are not declaring war against Holland because of military expediency.

Advisor Minami—What is Germany's attitude?

Premier—German entrance into the war in our support is almost certain, and negotiations to that effect are now in progress.

Advisor Nara—What is the attitude of the Soviet Union?

Premier—The attitude of the Soviet Union is one of circumspection.

Advisors Sugawara and Fukai submitted questions on the expenditure of war funds, matters of material, etc., which were answered by the Minister of Finance and the Premier.

Advisor Sutakami—Is it the question of whether or not we should declare war that you want us to consider? I mean, has an Imperial Rescript already been issued on the beginning of the war?

Premier—Yes.

(Foreign Minister Togo enters and takes his place.)

Advisors Futakami and (?Ikeda?) pointed out that the use of the word "America," [BEIKOKU] in the suggested draft of the Imperial Rescript which had been appended for advisement, might be misunderstood to apply to all the Americas, and recommended a revision, but the Premier and the Head of the Treaty Bureau explained that no such misunderstanding was possible.

Last of all, Foreign Affairs Minister Togo reported on the diplomatic situation which had preceded the commencement of war.

[3] The documents under discussion were approved by a unanimous vote.

Full session, 10 A. M. Dec 8, Imperial Palace, Higashidame Room

His Imperial Majesty was present.

The rest of the Majesty was the same as at the meeting of the Committee of Advisement.

Committee President Suzuki presented his advisement report which was unanimously approved.

EXHIBIT NO. 132A

From: Washington (Nanso)

To: Tokyo

30 September 1941

Msg. #881

Part 2 (*) (revelation of the message)

Said Admiral is a man who thinks that war between Japan and America would bring about no advantageous results for either country and that it is impossible to solve economic problems by means of arms. He was cordial in his attitude toward me from beginning to end. No I told him how much I regretted that since my arrival to take up my post, I had not been able to accomplish anything at all, to which he said, "All the people who know your Excellency deeply appreciate your efforts", and pointing out the apprehensions expressed in the Business Conditions Weekly (*) regarding Far-Eastern problems (the gist of the article is to the effect that, while a showdown (*) between Japan and America is imminent, war between those two countries is unnecessary and that if Japan is able to change and readjust her policy, America will be mindful of her prosperity), he urged me to read the article and said that he would put forth due efforts in the matter.

I would request that the above information be conveyed to the Navy Minister. (Fins)

* Part I appears under 886 22847.

† Expressed by the English words.